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American Indians and the Burger Court* 
John R. Hermann, Trinity University 
Karen O'Connor, The American University 
Objective. Like many politically disadvantaged groups, American lndian in­
terests have turned to the courts when they lack access or clout in the electoral 
process. Unlike many ocher disadvantaged groups, rhe litigation activities of 
American Indian interests have failed to garner much scholarly attention. The 
purpose of this research is to examine how American Indian interests fared 
before rhe Burger Courr (1969-85 October terms). Methods. The 63 full opin­
ion cases regarding issues critical to American Indian inrerests were identified 
by examining the United States Reports. Each case was coded as whether or 
nor che Courr decided in favor of the parry advancing American Indian inter­
esrs. Results. American Indian interests won over one-half of the cases decided 
by the Burger Court during the 1969-85 terms. Additionally, the appellant 
status of the party advancing American Indian interests and the issue area being 
litigated were important determinants in the direction of the Burger Court's 
decisions. Co11cl11sio11s. While American Indian interests won more cases than 
they lost dming the 1969-85 terms, the Burger Court's decisions did not result 
in a coherent body of law. 
Researchers long have tudied group who try to achieve their policy 
preferences in the courts when they lack access or clout in the electoral 
process (Cortner, '1968; Edsall and Edsall, 1 99 1; Lawrence, 1 990; 
O'Connor, 1980; O'Connor and Epstein, 1 982, 1 983; Sorauf, 1 976; 
Vose, 1 959) .  Like many other groups, American Indians have also 
turned to the courts to lobby for their interests. Yet, their efforts failed 
to garner much scholarly attention (but see Deloria and Lytle [ 1 983J, 
Shattuck and Norgren I 1 979, 1 991 J, Wilkins I 1990], and Wunder 
1 1 9941 ) .  
Because so few political scientists have examined the interests of 
American Indians or American Indians as an interest group of any 
kind-let alone how they are treated in the American legal system­
we offer this preliminary study of how American Indian interests fared 
in the Burger Court to find out if they were treated differently by the 
Supreme Court than other disadvantaged groups. 
American Indian cases began to receive far more attention from the 
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Court during the Burger Court years. Almost simultaneously with the 
development of the California Indian Legal Services {CILS) and the 
Native American Rights Fund {NARF), the Supreme Court decided 
more American Indian cases (35) in the 1970s than in any other pre­
vious decade in the Court's history {Wilkinson, 1987: 2). Additionally, 
while more than 95 percent of certiorari petitions failed to win review 
during the 1969-85 terms, approximately 25 percent (n = 394) of 
American Indian cases, as defined as such by U.S. Law Week, were 
granted plenary review. 
The explosion in federal Indian law occurred in the wake of litigation 
on behalf of other minority or disadvantaged groups, including African 
Americans, women, and Hispanics. Although American Indians are 
truly a disadvantaged minority in terms of a sense of powerlessness, 
numbers, racial or cultural characteristics, and a sense of group soli­
darity, their status as citizens in separate tribal nations gives them a 
unique political status that is different from that of other disadvan­
taged groups. Thus, the relationship between the United States gov­
ernment and the Indian tribes is also a political one, not a racial one, 
per se. Because American Indian activities are regulated primarily by 
the federal government (and not the states), the U.S. Supreme Court 
plays an especially important role in the Court's assessment of Indian 
rights. Although the federal government clearly does not exercise the 
degree of control over Indians and tribes that it did in earlier periods, 
it still plays an important role in the regulation of day-to-day Indian 
affairs. 
In spite of this racial/political difference, we opt here to treat Amer­
ican Indians in the context of the body of literature that exists con­
cerning politically disadvantaged groups' use of litigation to achieve 
their policy goals. To that end, we ask three questions: First, how often 
did the U.S. Supreme Court decide in favor of American Indian inter­
ests during the 1969-85 terms? Second, did the interests of American 
Indians fare better when their position was advanced by appellants in 
the litigation? Third, what type of American Indian issues dominated 
the Court's agenda and did the Court's support for American Indians 
vary based on the issue presented? But, before we address these ques­
tions, we offer an overview of the historical context in which to place 
the Burger Court decisions. 
Historical Background 
The Fonnative Years: 1776-1830. During the embryonic years of 
the United States, the national government's policies toward American 
Indians generally aimed at acquiring lndian lands through treaties and 
expanding Congress's authority over American Indian affairs through 
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a series of Trade and Intercourse Acts. By 1 790, almost every American 
Indian tribe along the eastern seaboard had negotiated a treaty with 
the United States. Most of these treaties had the same theme. The set­
tlers were prohibited from taking American Indian lands and the tribes 
were not allowed to enter into all iances or engage in land trades with 
foreign nations (Wunder, 1 994: 19 ) .
The U.S. Constitution offers l ittle guidance concerning the relation­
ship between American Indians and the United States.1 American In­
dians are explicitly mentioned only three times in the Constitution. 
Article l, Section 2, and later, the Fourteenth Amendment, excluded 
American Indians from being taxed by Congress or the states.2 More­
over, Article I, Section 8, stipulates that Congress has the authority to 
"regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
states, and with the Indian tribes." 
ln addition to the enumerated legislative powers explicitly men­
tioned in Article I, there are many implicit powers given to the legis­
lative and executive branches over American Indians. The "property 
clause" in Article TV allows Congress to dispose of and make all rules 
regarding the federal government's property, including American In­
dians' lands. The "necessary and proper clause" in Article I, Section 
8, authorizes Congress to enforce its enumerated powers. The "war 
powers clauses" in the ame article give the federal government power 
to wage wars against American Indians.3 The "supremacy clause" in 
Article VI gives the federal government authority over the states in 
regulating Indian affairs. And, the "treaty clause" in Article II, Section 
2 ,  gives the president the power to negotiate treaties with American 
Indians with the advice and consent of the Senate.4 
In essence, the Constitution offered a rough outline of the new gov­
ernment's authority over American Indian affairs. It is through the 
interpretation of the Constitution by Congress, the executive, and the 
courts, however, that the parameters of these powers are clarified. The 
Marshall Court took the leading role in defining the central tenets of 
federal Indian law through its interpretation of the Constitution and 
statutory law. 
Through a trilogy of cases, Chief Justice John Marshall's Federalist 
alJegiances were revealed, and the Court's belief that Indian nations 
1 For a more detailed discussion of American Indians and rhe U.S. Consrirurion, see 
Cohen ( 1982: 207-28) and Wunder ( 1994: 19-21 ). 
2 Article I, Section 2, srares that "Reprcsencarives and direct raxes shall be apporcioned 
among rhe several states which may be included within this Union, according to rhcir 
respective Numbers ... excluding Lndians not taxed." 
3 Sec clauses I, 11, and 12 of Article I, ecuon 8. 
4 From the outset, the Bill of Rights did nor apply ro American Indians, as they "were 
considered both pre-Bill of R1ghrs and extra-Bill of Rights" (Wunder, 1994: 21 ). 
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were subservient to the national government was enunciated.5 The 
model created by these cases "can be described broadly as calling for 
largely autonomous tribal governments subject to an overriding federal 
authority but free from state control" (Wilkinson, 1987: 24 ).6 
The Marshall trilogy continues as the dominant precedent and stan­
dard by which the Court interprets the relationship between American 
Indians and the United States. The model also defines the trust rela­
tionship between American Indians and the federal government. The 
federal government has virtually unfettered authority over American 
Indians, yet it has a special relationship or even an obligation to act in  
rhei r best interests. 
Indian Removal and Reservation Life: 1830-80. In the early nine­
teenth century, as the United States tried to accommodate the west­
ward movement of the white <;ettlers, it also attempted to avoid the 
potential conflicts between the whites and the American Indians.; The 
United Stares' solution was to pressure the American Indians to sur­
render their lands through treaties. Virtually every treaty entered into 
during this period involved removing American Indians from the east­
ern part of the United States to lands west of the Mississippi River. 
While many tribes were willing to relinquish their lands through trea­
ties, m:my resisted, including the Choctaws and the Cherokees. 
Voluntary migration was no longer a viable option for the American 
Indians when Andrew Jackson was elected president in 1828. He 
promised to move the Indians westward and persuaded Congress to 
pass the Indian Removal Act of 1830. The Act forced the American 
Indians to move west of the Mississippi River, and those who resisted 
were subject to state criminal and civil jurisdiction. While the Chero­
kees' "trail of rears'' is the most well-known tribal indignity, many 
other Indian tribes endured similar horrifying experiences including 
the Chippewas, Choctaws, Creeks, and Chickasaws (Foreman, 
1932: 21-28). 
Beginning in the 1850s, with the rise of industrialization coupled 
with westward expansion, the United States government isolated [n­
dians on reservations, confiscated their lands, and denied chem basic 
political rights. Indian reservations were administered by the federal 
government, and Indians usually lived in substandard conditions. 
In 187 L, moreover, Congress passed the Appropriations Act 
5Thc rrilO&')' con;"red of Johnson v. Mclnrosh ( 1823), Cherokee Nation u. Georgia 
( 183 l ), and Worcester v. Georgia ( 1832), ofrcn caUed rhe Marshall trilogy. 
6 By "overriding federal aurhority," we mean rhac Congress has broad powers over 
American Indian affairs or what courts often rcrm the ''plenary power" of Congress, bur 
these powers are "not synonymous wirh 'absolute' or 'total' "(Cohen, 1982: 219). 
"Thi; discussion relics upon Cohen ( 1982: 78-821, Prucha (1984: 184-200), and 
Washburn (197Sb: 16S-69). 
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(Prucha 1 975: L36). The Act prevented any further formal treaty mak­
ing between the United States and American Indians although, as 
Cohen ( 1982) noted, the United States continues to negotiate dozens 
of agreements with Indian tribes that have a imilar effect. Most com­
mentators agree that the central reason for the termination of treaty 
making was because the House of Repre entatives wanted to play a 
more instrumental role in the regulation of American Indian affairs 
(Fritz, 1 976 : 85; Prucha, 1 974 : 67- 70) .
During this period, the U.S. Supreme Court reasserted and expanded 
on the key principles pronounced in the Marshall trilogy. Congress's 
authority was expanded through two liquor cases: U.S. v. Holliday 
( 1 865) and U.S. v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey ( 1 876). In both, 
the Court gave Congress authority to regulate the sale and consump­
tion of alcohol by American Indians. Congress's authority to regulate 
alcohol was justified, according to the Court, by the commerce clause 
and Congress's police powers to regulate for the health, safety, and 
morality of American Indians. On the other hand, states till possessed 
limited power in regulating the tribes. In the Kansas Indians decision 
( 1 886), for example, the Court held that the Shawnees could not be 
taxed by the tare of Kansas. Thus, Congress' authority over Ameri­
can Indians seemed to have few constraints, whereas the states contin­
ued to play a nominal role in regul::icing their affair . 
Assimilation: 1880-1928. fn the 1 880s, the federal government be­
gan to promote assimilation over separation. The assimilation move­
ment's central goal was to destroy tribal culture and ab orb American 
Indians into mainstream American culture. The assimilation move­
ment was partially triggered in respon e ro the Court's decision in  Ex
/Jarte Crow Dog ( J 883 ). In this case, Crow Dog murdered Spotted 
Tail, the chief of the Sioux nation. In accordance with certain Sioux 
tribal customs, Crow Dog paid the relatives of Spotted Tail fifty dol­
lars, eight hor es, and a blanket as re titution for his crime. The District 
Attorney for the South Dakota Territory, however, tried Crow Dog in 
federal district court, where he was found guilty of first degree murder 
and ordered to be hanged. Crow Dog appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, and Justice Stanley Matthews, writing for the Court, held rhat 
the federal courts had no jurisdiction over crimes committed between 
Indians in Indian country. 
Outraged by the Court's deci ion, Congres passed the Major 
Crimes Acr of 1 885 .8 The Act made it a federal offense, rather than a 
tribal offense, for American Indians tO commit one of any seven crimes 
on the re ervation: murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to 
kill, arson, burglary, and larceny. 
RThis discussion relics on \X/ashhurn ( l 975b: 271 ). 
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In an even more significant step toward assimilation, Congress 
passed the General Al lotment Act or Dawes Act (named after the spon­
sor of the bill) of 1887.9 Its purpose was to end communal ownership 
of the tribes and encourage private ownership. Each American Indian 
family was given a certain acreage of land and the surplus land was 
sold to whites. lt is estimated chat Indian lands were reduced from 
about 140 million acres to less than 52 million (Wilkinson, 1987: 20). 
In commenting on the ramifications of chis Act to Congress in 1901, 
President Theodore Roosevelt characterized it is "a mighty pulverizing 
engine to break up the tribal mass" (Washburn, 1975: 242). To foster 
"assimilation" further, American Indian children were sent to board­
ing schools away from the reservations, native languages and rituals 
were banned on reservations, and, in 1924, American Indians were 
made U.S. citizens and granted the right to vote. Like what happened 
to the earlier enfranchised African Americans, several states (i.e., Utah, 
Arizona, and New Mexico) continually attempted to prevent American 
Indians from voting through a variety of methods, including residency 
requirements, lack of state power over Indian conduct, language re­
quirements, and guardianship (Deloria and Lytle, 1983: 222-26; Price, 
1973: 229-3 7). 
During the assimilation era, the Supreme Court legitimized Con­
gress's "allotment" agenda by holding that Congress's authority over 
American Indians was plenary.10 More precisely, the "Court recog­
nized a seemingly unlimited federal power to alter tribal property and 
jurisdictional prerogatives contemplated by the treaties and treaty stat­
utes" (Wilkinson, 1987: 24 ). 
Many scholars define the assimilation era as one of the darkest in 
the history of American Indians. Many progressives, however, took on 
the cause of Indian welfare and helped to form many American Indian 
groups, although these groups often reflected progressive movement 
goals.11 The National Indian Association, Indian Citizenship Commit­
tee of Boston, Indian Rights Association, and the National Indian De­
fense Association al l  were created to lobby (in some form) to protect 
the general welfare of American Indians. These groups published let­
ters, sponsored missions, conducted investigations, and lobbied Con­
gress on behalf of American Indians. 
Indian Reorgattization: 1928-42. The 1920s and 1930s brought a 
new enthusiasm for American Indian auconomy and a disdain for the 
assimilationist policies of the allotment era (Cohen, 1982: 144). The 
federal government began to reappraise the conditions of American 
9 For a more detailed discussion of the Dawes Acr, sec Washburn (1975a). 
10 Sec United States v. Ktlgnma ( 1886), United States v. McBratney ( 1881 ), and Lone 
Wol(v. Hitchcock (1903). 
11 This discussion relics heavily upon Hagan ( 1993: 135-36). 
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lndians.12 The Merriam Report of 1 928  found that the assimilation 
policies were a dismal failure and that most American Indians lived in 
abject poverty. American Indians lacked basic health care, illiteracy 
was rampant, annual incomes were below the poverty level, and the 
population of American Indians had reached a historical low. 
To address these problems, President Franklin 0. Roosevelt ap­
pointed John Collier, a champion of the Indian cause and an officer of 
the National Indian Defense Association, as Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs. Collier lobbied Congress and President Roosevelt for a reso­
lution to end the assimilationist policies and to promote Indian sov­
ereignty. Col lier's dedication to the American Indian cause, when cou­
pled with the Merriam Report, prompted Congress to pass the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934. The Act repealed the Allotment Act, en­
couraged community ownership and tribal culture, and gave American 
Indians preferential treatment for government positions in Indian 
service. 
Termination: 1943-67. World War II brought an end to the short­
lived trial of Indian revival. In an effort to support World War II, the 
United States cut the domestic budget-and the budget for American 
Indians was also trimmed.13 The Eisenhower administration requested 
that the Hoover Commission recommend cost savings programs. The 
Commission suggested that the federal government transfer most of its 
Indian programs to the states. Pre idem Eisenhower also appointed 
Dillon S. Myer as Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Myer was a strong 
proponent of the termination movement, and his past government ex­
perience included supervising the relocation camps of Japanese Amer­
icans during World War LI (Wunder, 1994: 100).
The termination movement reached full stride when Congress passed 
Public Law 280, which allowed five states with exceptions, for the first 
time, to maintain both criminal and civil jurisdiction over American 
Indians. The trust relationship between the tribes and United States 
was also severed in these five states. 
With a separate American Indian agenda, the Warren Court, how­
ever, limited the parameters of the termination policy by safeguarding 
Indian sovereignty. In Williams v. Lee (1959), Justice Hugo Black, 
writing for the majority, held that Arizona could not regulate contracts 
between Indians and non-Indians on reservation lands. Instead, the 
Court held that the Navajo tribe had exclusive judicial jurisdiction over 
such disputes. And, in Menominee Tribe of lndians v. United States
12This discussion relics upon Deloria and Lyde ( 1983: 13-20), Philip (1977: 113-34), 
and Wunder ( 1994: 146). 
llThis discussion relies upon Cohen (1982: 152-80) and Wunder (1994: I 00-108). 
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( 1968), justice Douglas found that termination did not mean the ab­
rogation of existing treaty rights for tribes. Thus, the Warren Court 
took a leading role in hastening the end of the termination era. 
Self-Determination: 1968-Present. It was not until the 1960s, at the 
same time when other groups including women were beginning to mo­
bilize for greater civil rights, that Indians also began to mobilize 
(Shattuck and Norgren, 1979: 5-15). Perhaps Indian groups' most im­
portant achievement during this period was their ability in helping to 
garner the necessary support for the codification of the Indian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968, which prohibited states from assuming jurisdiction 
in Indian country (amending Public Law 280) yet also allowed most 
amendments of the Bill of Rights to apply in Indian country.'4 
Although the Indian Civil Rights Act stands out as a prominent vic­
tory for many, some Indian groups did not perceive its passage as a 
victory and took measures to draw attention to what they perceived 
as continued legal inequalities. Like the civil rights and women's rights 
movements, American Indians had a more radical as well as a more 
traditional branch. The radical movement was led by young American 
Indian groups who came predominantly from urban areas (Wunder, 
1994: 157). Jn the late 1960s, for example, members of the American 
Indian Movement (AIM) seized Alcatraz Island cbiming it ::i.s p::i.rt of
their aboriginal lands (Costello, 1980: 58-59). In the summer of 1972, 
AIM planned the "trail of broken treaties." AIM caravanned from 
Minneapolis to Washington, D.C., and organized a "sit-in" at the Bu­
reau of Indian Affairs (Wunder, 1994: 158). And, in 1973, national 
attention was drawn to the plight of American Indians when AIM took 
over Wounded Knee, South Dakota, the site of the massacre of 150 
Indians by the United States military in 1 890 (Costello, 1980: 59). 
Several American Indians, however, took a more traditional avenue 
in redressing their grievances. Many lndians were attracted to the study 
of law at the American Indian Law Center at the University of New 
Mexico. Soon, the clinic there as well as graduates of its programs 
began to file hundreds of test cases in the federal courts. Around the 
same time, the Native American Rights Fund (NARF} was founded in 
1970 in Boulder, Colorado. ft quickly became the NAACP LDF of the 
Indian rights movement as the "courts became the forum of choice for 
Indian tribes and their members" (Strickland, 1992: 579). Thus, the 
Burger Court became a central actor in the formation of American 
Indian policy. 
14T1rle II of rhe Indian Civil Righrs Act applies the First, Fourrh, Fifth, Sixrh, and 
Eighth Amendments and the Fourreenth AmenJmcnc's equal protecrion clause to Indian 
country. Additionally, no bill of arcninder or ex posr facto laws can be exercised on mbal 
lands. For a more derailed discussion of the Indian Civil Right� Acr, sec, for example, 
Wunder ( 1994: 124-46). 
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American Indian cases heard by the Burger Court are diverse: they 
range from cases involving hunting, fishing, and land rights to those 
involving civil rights. Thus, when we analyze American Indian success 
rates in the Court, the kinds of issues present in each case are important 
factors to be considered. 
Methods 
The 63 full opinion cases regarding American Indians decided by the 
U.S. Supreme Court during the J 969-85 terms were identified by ex­
amining the United States Reports.15 American Indian cases are defined 
here as ones that include American Indians as individual a well as 
American Indian tribes, or those cases where the United States govern­
ment is claiming to advance American Indian interests or to protect 
that trust relationship. The aim of this study i to examine collectively 
how the interests of American Indians and tribes are protected or ad­
vanced by Supreme Court litigation.1" 
Success and success rates are operationalized as whether or not the 
Court decided in favor of the party advancing American Indian inter­
e ts. More specifically, our dependent variable is dichotomous ( I  = in 
favor of American Indian interests; 0 = against American Indian in­
terests}.17 Success rates were computed by dividing the number of cases
in which the Court supported American Indian claims by the total 
population of case . Theoretically, these score can range from 0 to J .
15  A lisr of these cases i s  available b y  conc:icring rhe authors. Per c.:uriam decisions were 
excluded from this analysi . We specifically chose not ro use the Spaerh dara base because 
the Spaeth data operationalize American Indian cases as those where American Indians 
arc a parry. We, in contrast, examine all cases rhar had an impact on American Indian 
inri.-rcsrs, including those cases where the federal government is a parry in a c.:ase on behalf 
of American Indian interests. 
16The reader should he mindful rhar American Indians as individuals and Indian tribe� 
as nations is a fundamental distinction that is crincal ro understanding federal Indian 
law. For purposes of this srudy, however, we have chosen ro examine all cases involving 
issues thar are crucial ro American Indian interests without reference 10 this distinction 
because rhe purpose of rhi� srudy is ro determine how American Indian interests have 
fored in rhe Burger Court-irrespective of rribal or individual inreresrs. 
Moreover, ro begin ro am1lyzc rhe dara any diffcrenrly would nor :illow us ro make 
any meaningful comparisons. For example, in our data scr of 59 cases, we found that 
the Court supported individual Indian lirigants in 52 percent of rhc 21 cases and tribes 
in 52 percenr of the 25 c.1ses. And, in cases where the federal governmenr rcprescnred an 
individual Indian litigant, the Court's support rares were 71 percent (11 = 7); in cases 
where the federal government represenred tribe!>, however, rhe Court's support rares were 
0 percent (11 = 3). Still, in cases where a non-Indian parry advanced an Indian interesr, 
the Court'> support rares were 66 perccnr (11 = .3). Thus, given rhc small number of cases 
under analysis, making rhesi.- kinds of distincrions is nor practical here. 
17 Four cases were excluded from the analysis because rhey were split decisions. 1.n 
c.:ascs where rhe parries were Indian versus mbe. the rribe was coded in favor of Ameri an 
Indian interesr . This coding scheme avoided any coding biases and reflect!> our belief 
that rhe community interest outweighs the individual interest. 
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The same calculations were made for each justice to calculate individ­
ual support rates. 
Success Rates. As revealed in  Table 1, American Indians won 53 
percent of the 59 cases decided by the Burger Court. Considerable 
variation exists among the individual justices' support rates for Amer­
ican Indian claims. Justices Douglas, Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, 
and Stewart supported American Indian claims in over 50 percent of 
the cases, whereas Justices White, Powell, O'Connor, Stevens, and 
Rehnquist all had support rates of less than 50 percent. Justice Douglas 
had the h ighest support rates, 94 percent (n = 16). In contrast, Justice 
Rehnquisr's support rate for American Indians was less than 33 percent 
(n = 55). 
In the case of Justice Douglas, his liberal tendencies have been well 
documented (Rohde and Spaeth, 1976: 143; Segal and Spaeth, 
1993: 252-53). His love of the land and his support for American 
Indian interests are also well known (Johnson, 1990: 191-97; 
Wilkinson, 1990: 233-45). Johnson ( 1990), for example, noted that 
Justice Douglas was "an ardent supporter of tribal self-determination 
and a firm believer that agreements with Indian tribes should be con­
strued in favor of the Indians, and should be upheld" (p. 206). More 
interesting is the uncharacteristic low support for American Indian 
interests by the usually more liberal Justice Stevens. O'Connor and 
Epstein ( 1983: 328), for example, found Justice Stevens to support 
TABLE 1 
Court's and Justices' Support for American Indian Cases: 1969-85 Terms 
Support Rates Support Rates 
Court and Support Rates as Appellant 
as Respondent 
Justices N % N % N % 
Court 59 52.5% 28 75% 31 32.2% 
Douglas 16 93.8 13 100.0 3 66.7 
Marshall 58 74 1 28 89.3 30 60 0 
Brennan 57 71.9 26 88.5 31 58.1 
Blackmun 56 60.7 25 68.0 31 54.8 
Stewart 38 55.3 26 65.4 12 33.3 
Burger 58 50.0 28 75.0 30 26.7 
Harlan 2 50.0 1 100.0 1 0.0 
White 59 45.8 28 60.7 31 32.3 
Powell 51 43.1 24 66.7 27 22.2 
O'Connor 21 42.9 2 100.0 19 36.8 
Stevens 42 38.1 14 42.9 28 35.7 
Rehnquist 55 30.9 25 52.0 30 13.0 
Black 3 0 0 2 0.0 1 0 0
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gender-based claim in 57 percent of the cases. Other studies have 
found him to be among the most l iberal on the Court during the Burger 
Court era (Heck, 1981: L97; Goldman, 1982: 542). 
One might hypothesize that justices from "western or southwestern 
stares," such as Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist, might be better ac­
quainted with the plight of American Indians and, thus, be more sym­
pathetic to their claims. Thar was not the case. Justice O'Connor's 
support for gender-based claims, for example, was 67 percent, while 
it was only 43 percent for American Indians. Justice Rehnquist's low 
support for American Indian claims was consistent with his generally 
.low support for disadvantaged groups. [n fact, he was more supportive 
of American Indian claims (31 percent) than for gender-based claims 
(O'Connor and Epstein, 1983 : 328)- 16 percent-at least before 
Justice O'Connor came on the Court. O'Connor and Segal ( 1990: 100) 
found that Justice Rehnquist's support for gender-based claims in­
creased to 50 percent after Justice O'Connor came on the Court. 
Interestingly, Justice Burger's support rate were much higher for 
American Indian claimants than for African Americans or claims in­
volving gender. Burger supported American Indian claims in 58 per­
cent of the 19 cases during the 1972-76 terms, while he supported 
African American litigants in only 34 percent of the 65 cases examined 
by Ulmer and Thomson ( 198 1 :449) during the same time period. Sim­
ilarly, Burger's support for American Indian claims were much higher 
(5 1 percent in 39 cases) than for gender-based claims (25 percent in 
68 cases) (O'Connor and Epstein, 1983: 328). 
Support Sco1'es as an Appellant. The Court's tendency to decide in 
favor of appellants is well documented (Baum, 1976, 1977, 1979; 
Epstein and O'Connor, 1988; George and Epstein, 1992; Salokar, 
1992; Sheehan, Songer, and Mischler, 1992). Many argue that the 
justices employ an "error correcting" trategy; that is, the justices take 
cases when they "seek to 'correct errors' in the lower courts by voting 
to grant a hearing whenever a lower-court decision departed signifi­
cantly from their most preferred doctrinal position" (Baum, 1977: 14). 
American Indians clearly benefited when they were the appellant. As 
indicated in Table 1, the Court supported American Indian claimants 
in 75 percent of those cases. In sharp contrast, the Court's support fell 
to less than a third (32.2 percent) when American Indians were the 
respondent. 
The individual justices were also more supportive of American In­
dians as the appellant. With the exceptions of Justices Black and 
Stevens, every justice supported American Indians as an appellant in 
over 50 percent of the cases. Further, when we controlled for when 
American Indians were the appellants, the low support rates by Justices 
Stevens and O'Connor may be explained. In the 2 1  cases in which 
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O'Connor participated, American Indians were the appellant in only 
about 10 percent. In the case of Justice Stevens, American Indians were 
the appellants in only a third of the 42 cases in which he participated. 
Stevcns's and O'Connor's support races may have been higher if Amer­
ican Indian claimants were che appellant in a greater number of cases. 
Issue Areas and Support Rates. Table 2 reveals the kinds and dis­
tribution of issue areas in which American Indian cases fall. Four is­
sues-land claims, natural resources, taxation, and what we term pro­
cedure/jurisdiction, which are cases that involve questions peculiar to 
tribal claims or the status of Indian reservations-make up just under 
90 percent of the cases decided by che Burger Court. The kinds of cases 
heard by the Court involving American Indians are quite different than 
those involving African Americans and women. Unlike those of other 
politically disadvantaged groups, American Indians cases did not pri­
marily involve traditional civil rights or liberties issues-at least during 
the Burger Court era. As a politically disadvantaged group, American 
Indian interests are unique and diverse in relation ro their counterparts. 
As Table 2 suggests, the success rates of American Indian claimants 
varied considerably based on the issue area being litigated. In land 
claims, American Indians enjoyed a 50 percent (n = 16) success rate. 
One of the most important victories for American Indians in this arena 
was in County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation ( 1985). At issue 
was the validity of a 1795 agreement between the Oneida Nation and 
New York regarding the transfer of land to the state because the trans­
fer did not have the required prior federal approval. In a 5 to 4 deci­
sion, the Court held that the 175-year-old agreement was invalid, 
which allowed the Oneida nation a federal common law right to sue 
for a breach of its possessory rights ro aboriginal lands. 
In the procedure/jurisdiction arena, American Indian claimants won 
TABLE 2 
Court's Support Rates for Different American Indian Issues: 1969-85 
Distribution 
of Issues Support Rates 
Issue N (%) (%) 
Land claims 16 27.1% 50% 
Natural resources 13 22.0 38.5 
Procedure/junsdicllon 13 22.0 53.8 
Tax 10 17.0 80 0 
Civil rights/civil liberties 4 6.8 50.0 
Other 2 3.4 0.0 
Criminal 1 1.7 100 0 
Total 59 100.0 
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5 4  percenr of the 1 3  cases. Their success may be cred ited in large part 
to their appellant status. American Indians were the appellants in 69
percent of the procedure/jurisdiction case . An i llustrative example of 
a procedure/jurisdiction case is Kennerly v. District Court ( 1 97 1  ). The 
Kennerly Court struck down Montana's assertion that it possessed 
judicial jurisdiction regarding a civil contract between an Indian and 
non-Indian on a re ervation. 
In the area of natural resources, American Indians were nor as suc­
cessful a in land or procedure/jurisdiction claims. They won only 39 
percent (11 = 1 3) of their cases. The low success rates in natural re­
source cases may be attributed to the Court's preference to defer to the 
rates' and Congress's police powers to preserve scarce resources al­
though resources are al o critical to the survival of some tribes, as 
tribes. For example, in United States v. Dion ( 1 986)  the Court held 
chat, pursuant to the Eagle Protection Act, American Indians were pro­
hibited from hunting eagles. 
In contrast, American Indian enjoyed a very high success rare in 
taxation case , 80 percent (11 = 1 0) .  Most of these cases involved at­
tempts by states to rax individuals who resided in Indian country. This 
high success rate may be due to a long line of precedent established by 
rhe Court as well as by codification of these principles in the Tndian 
Civil Rights Act of 1 96 8 .  The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1 968 prohibits 
state jurisdiction on tribal lands, unle s consent is attained by Congress 
or the affected tribe.IS Further, since Worcester v. Georgia ( 1 832), the 
Court has usually held that states would play a limited role in the 
regulation of Indian affairs in lndian country. As the Court held in 
McClanahan v. A rizona State Tax Commission ( 1 973), this principle 
also applie to state taxation. 
Discussion 
While some justice appear to di like American Indian case (see 
Woodward and Arm trong [ 1 979 : 359, 4 1 2j) ,  at least rwo justices 
from the Burger Court placed great importance on American Indian 
cases. Said one justice: "We now have three westerners on the Court 
and we are very concerned about . . .  Indian cases. And you can tell 
by our votes for cert that we are interested in them" (Perry, 1 99 1 :  26 1 ) .
Another justice stared: "Actually, I think the Indian cases are kind of 
fascinating. It goe into history and you learn about it, and the way 
we abused some of the Indians, we rhat is the U.S. government" (Perry, 
1 99 1 : 262) .  Yer, that fascination ha nor necessarily resulted in a co­
herent body of law. 
I S  For :in exrended discu.,s1on of rhc lnd1:111 Civil Ri idus A1:r ( 1 968), sec Cohen 
(1982:202-4). 
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As noted earlier, American Indian cases are different than those in­
volving other minority groups. The issues of federal preemption and/ 
or inherenr tribal sovereignty permeate most cases irrespective of issue 
area. Thus, unlike the bodies of law that have developed as the Court 
has addressed issues of race and gender-based discrimination over the 
years, the range of issues presented by American Indian interests to the 
Court have resulted in little doctrinal coherence and, thus, mixed suc­
cess rates. One author has noted that Justice Stewart was supposed to 
have remarked at a visit at Boalt Law School that "any case the Court 
decides in Indian law is stillborn and has no precedential value" 
( Pelcyger, 1 983 : 3 1  ) . More recently, one former attorney at the Native 
American Rights Fund remarked with some dismay, 
I have one per peeve. Since White Mountain Apache i1. Bracker [ 1 9801, 
rhe Court said they were going to decide each case on a case-by-case basis. 
As an attorney, try to tell a company to do business in Indian country and 
what the law is when the Court decides issues on a case-by-case basis. 
This is a terrible view, an ad hoc view, (which is l devised for state juris­
diction over tribes. [Th1sj conflicrs with our understanding of Indian law. 
They, [the jusrices,) should follow Worcester. Companies are now scared 
to go on reservations with no firm idea of how the Court will decide cases. 
The Indian commerce clause shields lndian tribes from state [jurisdicrionj. 
(Author interview, 20 May 1994) 
This case-by-case approach undoubtedly is reflected in the mixed suc­
cess rates of American Indian interests in Court. 
Just as important as their overall success rates, however, are the 
nature and impact of individual cases on the status of American Indi­
ans. American Indians, for example, were dealt a stunning blow in 
Oliphant u. Suquamish Tribe ( 1 978) when the Court struck down 
tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian 
country thereby adversely affecting their efforts to preserve exclusive 
jurisdiction on reservations (especially in cases involving state jurisdic­
tion).  Similarly, in Rice LI. Rehner ( 1 983)  the Court dealt tribal sov­
ereignty another blow when it upheld concurrent tribal and state reg­
ulation of on-reservation sales of alcoholic beverages. And, in 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation 
( 1 980), the Court upheld a state cigarette tax on reservation sales by 
a tribe to non-Indians. All  three cases symbolized a retreat from the 
Marshall trilogy. 
In sharp comparison, in Santa Clara Pueblo LI. Martinez ( 1 978), the 
Court held that a tribe had authority to choose the criteria for its 
membership, even if it may have violated a competing gender-based 
equal protection claim. Later, in White Mountain Apache v. Bracker
( 1 980), the Court struck down state motor license and fuel use taxes 
on a non-Indian corporation engaged in logging activities in Indian 
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country. Moreover, in  Ramah Navajo School Board v. Board of Rev­
enue ( 1 982), the Court struck down a state tax on a non-Indian cor­
poration building a school facility in Indian country. 
These decisions highlight the Court's discomfort with American In­
dian cases and supports observations that the Court treats many Amer­
ican Indian cases on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis regardless of the 
issue area being l itigated before the Court. Taken together, these cases 
also i l lustrate the uncertainty of the development of federal Indian law 
and the need to modify traditional methods of judicial behavior anal­
ysis to allow better comparisons of American Indian interests to other 
disadvantaged groups. SSQ 
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